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Note

Referendum: The Appropriations
Exception in Nebraska
Lawrence v. Beermann, 192 Neb. 507, 222 N.W.2d 809 (1974).
1. INTRODUCTION
The referendum process has been defined as "the submission of
laws . .. to the voting citizens for their ratification or rejection,

these laws first having been passed upon by the people's representatives .... ." It was primarily used during the nineteenth century
to settle questions arising in certain troublesome areas of state law,
such as the location of state capitals, 2 and for approval of state
constitutions.3 The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
witnessed a broadened use of the referendum, reflecting the growth
of the Progressive movement in the United States.4 The increased
use was justified by the belief that direct popular legislation would
overcome the legislative abuses of the time.5 Statutory law was
subjected to the referendum process in addition to the traditionally
referable matters.
The Nebraska Constitution excludes only one type' of statute
from submission to the referendum process. This limitation appears in Article III, section 3:
The second power reserved is the referendum which may be invoked, by petition, against any act or part of an act of the Legislature, except those making appropriations for the expense of the
state government or a state institution existing at the time of the
passage of such act.
1. E. OBERHOLTZEP, TnE REnRENDUm
2. Id. at 51-85.
3. Id. at 35.

IN AMERICA 9 (1893).

4. H.M. Hart & A.M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 687 (1958) (mimeograph).
5. For an early and highly critical view of this development, see Campbell, The Initiative and Referendum, 10 MICE. L. REv. 427 (1912). Supportive of maximizing the reserved powers of initiative and referen-

dum is Comment, The Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in Cal-

ifornia,54 CAxw. L. REv. 1717 (1966). For a discussion of general lim-

itations on the use of referendum, see Olson, Limitations and Litigation
Approaches: the Local Power of Referendum in Federal and State
Courts-A Michigan Model, 50 J. UMAw L. 209 (1972).
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Concern over the effect of potential reference of appropriation measures underlies this limitation. The first source of concern is the
resulting uncertainty of whether the measure will be approved by
the voters. Uncertainty also arises from delaying the effective date
of the bill even if subsequently approved. 6 A more fundamental
concern, however, was expressed by James Madison in 1787-that
of the division of society.7 Submission of measures requiring revenue raised through taxation would tempt the voter to reject an
appropriation for his immediate financial welfare at the expense
of vital governmental activities.
Recent passage and submission to the referendum process of
Legislative Bill 7728 [hereinafter "L.B. 772"], which established and
funded a system of increased state aid to public schools, emphasized
the difficulty in determining when the exception of Article III, section 3 applies to a particular statute. This problem was addressed
by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Beermann.9 This
Note will consider the court's analysis of the issues and the implications of the decision for future legislation.
II. ANALYSIS
Lawrence sought to enjoin the Secretary of State from placing
L.B. 772 on the November 1974 general election ballot for referendum. He contended the statute was a legislative appropriation for
the expense of state government or an existing state institution,
and therefore the proposed referendum was unconstitutional. The
supreme court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petition.
While the holding was correct, the analysis employed 'by the court
in its per curiam opinion failed to provide guidance in under6. NEB. CoNsT. art. 1I, § 3 provides in relevant part:
When the referendum is invoked, as to any act or part of
-act, other than emergency acts or those for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health or safety, by petition
signed by not less than ten per cent of the electors of the state,
distributed as aforesaid, it shall suspend the taking effect of
such act or part of act until the same has been approved by
the electors of the state.
7. Madison's fear of division over monetary matters was acute:
So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual
animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself,
the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and excite their most

violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source
of factions, has been the various and unequal distribution of
property.
THE FEDERALST No. 10, at 59 (J. Cook ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
8. L.B. 772, 83d Neb. Leg., 2d Sess. (1974).
9. 192 Neb. 507, 222 N.'W.2d 809 (1974).
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standing the proper scope of the exception to the referendum
power.
L.B. 772 generally provided for the establishment of the Public
School Support Trust Fund,10 from which the state was to meet
the increased financial burden it has assumed in the area of education." The bill set forth the method for determining the state's
funding commitment for the 1975-1976 and 1976-1977 school years' 2
and allotted specific sums of money from the fund to aid in specified
problem areas of school financing.' 3 The State Board of Education
was required to certify the amount to be raised through taxation
to cover expenditures authorized by the act.' 4 Repeal of the School
Foundation and Equalization Act, governing current state aid to
the public school system, was to become effective September 1,
1976.15
The Lawrence court failed to articulate clearly the requirements
of the Article III, section 3 exception to the referendum power. The
method of analysis suggested to the court by the appellant and discused below was apparently ignored. Yet its careful application
would have provided sorely needed clarification of the proper scope
and application of this exception. To find an act that was
qualified for the exception, the analysis required affirmative
answers to three cumulative questions: (1) Was L.B. 772 an "appropriation" measure; (2) If it was an appropriation measure, was
it for "expenses;" (3) If it was an appropriation for expenses, was
it for the expenses of "state government or a state institution" in
existence at the time the act was passed.' 6
A. "Appropriations"

The court's initial finding was that L.B. 772 was not an appropriation bill within the meaning of Article III, section 3. The court
perceived a failure to set apart from the public revenue a certain
sum of money as required ,by the Constitution of Nebraska.1' Instead the court viewed L.B. 772 as establishing a new scheme for
taxing and financing local public school districts. The first question
10. L.B. 772 § 3, 83d Neb. Leg. Sess. (1974).
11. Id. 99 4, 6-8.
12. Id.

13. Id. 99 5, 9, 10, 13.
14. Id. 9 15.
15. Id. § 24.

16. Brief for Appellant at 12, Lawrence v. Beermann, 192 Neb. 507, 222

N.W.2d 809 (1974).

17. NEB. CONST. art. II, § 25 provides in part: 'No money shall be drawn
from the treasury except in pursuance of a specific appropriation made
bylaw...."
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for the Lawrence court, and for legislators who may seek to avoid
the referendum, lies in the meaning of the term "appropriations."
The constitutional meaning of "appropriation" was given early
consideration in State ex rel. Norfolk Beet-Sugar Co. v. Moore.'8
Moore, the state auditor, refused to pay a bounty to a sugar manufacturer, in part because he believed there was no legal appropriation out of which he could pay it. The act establishing the bounty
designated the amount to be paid per pound of sugar, specified the
manner of determining the amount manufactured, and directed
payment to qualifying applicants, but set no maximum amount to
be paid under the program. The court provided the following definition: "[T] o 'appropriate' is to set apart from the public revenue
a certain sum of money for a specified object, in such manner that
the executive officers of the government are authorized to use that
money, and no more, for that object and for no other."'19 The unlimited availability of bounty for the production of sugar was not
"certain," and the bill thus failed to meet the constitutional requirement of specificity. In noting the defect, the court stated: "An
appropriation may be specific.., when its amount is to be ascertained in the future from the collection of the revenue. It cannot
be specific when it is to be ascertained only by the requisitions
which may be made by the recipients. '' 20 L.B. 772, like the bounty
bill in Moore, established a framework for determining the necessary appropriation in future years. In addition, however, L.B. 772
included a provision setting aside from the total amount taken from
the Public School Support Trust Fund three specific allocations of
five million dollars to alleviate specific problems of school financing.21 These sections clearly complied with the specificity requirement outlined in Moore,22 and the Lawrence court's failure to mention them in its opinion illustrates the lack of a systematic approach
in its analysis.
18. 50 Neb. 88, 69 N.W. 373 (1896). Constitutional exceptions to the referendum process vary among jurisdictions. Frequently included is an
exception for appropriation measures. See, e.g., Annot., 146 A.L.R.
299 (1943). However, in view of differences in wording and theories
of constitutional interpretation, comparisons of the exceptions in
various jurisdictions is of limited value and is not undertaken by
this Note.
19. Id. at 96, 69 N.W. at 376.
20. Id. at 99, 69 N.W. at 377.
21. L.B. 772 §§ 5, 9, 10, 13, 83d Neb. Leg. Sess. (1974).
22. A second source of difficulty encountered by the bounty bill in Moore
was the time period covered. The act expressly provided that it would
remain in effect for three years, exceeding the constitutional time limitation. 50 Neb. at 100, 69 N.W. at 377. This problem is discussed in
the text accompanying notes 24-29 infra.
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The Nebraska Supreme Court again considered the meaning of
"appropriations" in Rein v. Johnson.23 Suit was brought to enjoin
the expenditure of funds from the State Assistance Fund for purposes other than assistance. It was alleged that the act establishing
the fund was a continuous appropriation for assistance purposes,
consisting of all revenue from defined tax sources. The claim failed
for two reasons. First, a continuing appropriation of the nature
suggested -by the appellant would violate the constitutional time
restriction, 24 The purpose of the restriction was to force all governmental departments to appear regularly before the legislature to
obtain funds, thus ensuring closer fiscal control.25 A continuing
appropriation was obviously inconsistent with this purpose. The
same question arose in Lawrence with regard to the provisions of
L.B. 772. The language of the section containing the constitutional
time limitation had been altered in 1972, however, to exclude specific mention of it. 26

The trial court in Lawrence interpreted the

1972 amendment as simply recognizing that the legislature now
meets in annual sessions. The language "[e] ach Legislature shall
make appropriations for ...

expenses . . 27 was viewed as pre-

serving the time limitation. 28 The supreme court did not directly
implies that it conaddress the issue, although the court's language
29
curs with the district court's conclusion.
23. 149 Neb. 67, 30 N.W.2d 548 (1947), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948).

24. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 22 in effect at the time the dispute arose in

25.
26.

27.
28.
29.

Rein v. Johnson provided: "Each Legislature shall make appropriations for the expenses of the Government until the expiration of the
first fiscal quarter after the adjournment of the next regular session,
and all appropriations -shall end with such fiscal quarter."
149 Neb. at 77, 30 N.W.2d at 555.
NEB. CONST. art. ]I, § 22 applicable to Lawrence v. Beermann read:
Each Legislature shall make appropriations for the expenses
of the Government. And whenever it is deemed necessary to
make further appropriations for deficiencies, the same shall
require a two-thirds vote of all the members elected to the
Legislature. Bills making appropriations for the pay of members and officers of the Legislature, and for the salaries of the
officers of the Government, shall contain no provision on any
other subject.
Id.
Lawrence v. Beermann, No. 289, at 36 (Lancaster County Dist. Ct.,
filed Sept. 30, 1974).
It appears on the face of Legislative Bill 772 that no appropriation in the constitutional sense was intended because the
act, by its terms, sets up a funding provision, providing for
contributions, and provideg that the act shall not become
effective until September 1, 1976.
192 Neb. at 508, 222 N.W.2d at 810 (1974). A similar inference can
be drawn from another recent decision, in which the court noted that
if the bill intended to remain in effect through ensuing years was an
appropriation, it "may well be unconstitutional." Stahmer v. State,
192 Neb. 63, 66, 218 N.W.2d 893, 895 (1974).
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A second reason given by the Rein court for refusing to enjoin
the use of money from the State Assistance Fund for purposes other
than assistance was that the word "appropriated" as used in the
statute did not conform to the constitutional meaning. The term
meant, instead, that identified funds should be paid into the state
treasury, and, from there, administratively channeled to the Fund
for assistance purposes. The following distinction was drawn:
"The purpose or design of an appropriation bill is to make provision
for lawfully taking money out of the state treasury as distinguished
from lawfully putting money into the state treasury, there to be
allocated to a particular fund ....
This criticism was not applicable to L.B. 772. After the State
Board of Education had certified the amount of tax revenue needed
to fund the act, the State Board of Equalization and Assessment
was to adjust the sales and income tax rate to meet the need. The
Board would then certify to the State Treasurer the percentage of
total revenue to be deposited to the credit of the Public School
Support Trust Fund.31 The money was not to be placed in the
general fund and then administratively allocated, as was the case
with the State Assistance Fund in Rein. This absence of administrative allocation is essential in meeting the distinction drawn by
the court in Rein.3 2 A requirement that succeeding legislatures
order allocation of revenue into the Fund would establish a continuing appropriation with accompanying constitutional difficulties.3 3
The drafters of L.B. 772 avoided this pitfall by eliminating the need
for administrative allocation.
The initial step in qualifying for the exception to the referendum
power is thus a perilous one. The term "appropriation" embodies
several essential elements. The sum of money set aside must be
specific. The exact amount need not -be known at the time of the
act's passage, but must be ascertainable in the future from a specified revenue source and not solely from the requests of recipients.
Second, the appropriation power of each legislature extends only
to the end of the first fiscal quarter after adjournment of the next
regular session. The vitality of this element has not been directly
addressed by the court since a change in the constitutional provision, but is reasonably inferred from the court's language. 4 Further, funds must be allocated to specific budgetary items.3 5 Fi-

30. 149 Neb. at 78, 30 N.W.2d at 556.

31.
32.
33.
34.

L.B. 772 §§ 16, 18, 83d Neb. Leg. Sess. (1974).
See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 24-29 and accompanying text supra.
See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
35. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 25.
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nally, the statute must provide for removal of funds from the state
treasury, and not simply placement of funds in the treasury with
subsequent administrative allocation to a certain account. L.B. 772
appeared to comply with each element except the time limitation.
The need for specific determination of that element's validity is
obvious.

B. "Expense"
The initial finding in Lawrence, that L.B. 772 was not an appropriation measure, made further analysis unnecessary. The court,
however, went on to mention, with regrettable brevity, the terms
"expenses,". "state government" and "state institutions" in their
constitutional context. The discussion of these important terms began with a statement of preference for strict construction of the
terms of the appropriation exception. This theory of construction
gives broadest effect to the fundamental purpose of the reserved
36
power-to give the people the right to vote on specific legislation.
In reference to expenses, the court stated: "[T]he exception should
'be and must be construed to mean the ordinary running expenses
... and not to include money or appropriations or funds created
or acts which have as their design a new or different scheme for
the revenue raising and financing. . .. 37 Bartling v. Wait 38 was
cited as authority for this statement. The appellant in that case
sought to enjoin a referendum on an act which established an
armory for the state militia and provided the funds for its construction. The basis offered for an injunction was that the bill was an
appropriation falling within the constitutional exception to the referendum power. After considering the use designated for the
funds, the court disagreed and gave the following definition of "expenses:" "[T]he word 'expenses' as used in this section of the constitution must 'be construed to mean the ordinary running expenses
of the state government and existing state institutions, and not to
include money
to be paid for the erection of new and permanent
39
buildings."
The court in Lawrence, in the language noted above,40 excludes
from the meaning of "expenses" an appropriation designed as a different scheme for raising revenue. Bartling provides no support
for this stance. Significant in determining if an appropriation for
expenses exists is the nature of the object of that appropriation,
and not the system of funding itself. The drafters of L.B. 772 spe36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

192 Neb. at 508, 222 N.W.2d at 810.
Id. at 508-09, 222 N.W.2d at 810.
96 Neb. 532, 148 N.W. 507 (1914).
Id. at 538, 148 N.W. at 509.
See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
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cifically provided that the funds pay a portion of the "adjusted current operational expenditures" 41 and narrowed the qualifying expenditures to maintenance of existing school facilities and programs.4 2 Consideration of the funding system in addition to the
object of the expenditures would effectively exclude each novel
funding system regardless of its qualification for the exception in
every other respect. This judicial limitation on Article III, section
3 violates the established principle of43 constitutional interpretation
recognizing the utility of every clause.
C.

"State Government or State Institution"

The interpretation of the term "expenses" necessary in the
second step of the suggested analysis was impeded when the
Lawrence court incorporated in its review elements properly considered in determining compliance under the third step, i.e.,
whether the expenses were those of the state government or an
existing state institution. This final step in determining qualification for the exception to the referendum power requires an investigation of the meaning of the terms "state government" and "state
institutions." Bartling v. Wait44 again provides insight. The court
was presented with the question of whether the state militia for
whom the armory was to be constructed was part of state government or a state institution. It held that the militia was part of
state government, citing control of the governor, payment of staff
salaries by the state, and statutes governing its organization and
administration as evidence of this status. For purposes of the issue
in Lawrence, the more illuminating discussion pertained to the
meaning of "state institution:"
[T]he words "state institution" in this connection may have two
meanings, one the corporate, or in some instances the associated,
body which carries on the activities for which it is organized, the
other meaning the building or buildings
in which that body exercises its proper functions and activities. 45
The militia could thus be considered a state institution in the sense
of an associated body carrying on the activities for which it was
41. L.B. 772 § 4, 83d Neb. Leg. Sess. (1974).
42. Senator Jerome Warner, sponsor of L.B. 772, specifically emphasized
this point: "[T]he state does not seek to share all expenses but rather
support the day to day cost of administration, salaries, maintenance
.... " Hearing on L.B. 772 Before the Comm. on Educ., Neb. Legis.,
83d Sess. at 5 (1974). "
43. Anderson v. Tiemann, 182 Neb. 393, 155 N.W.2d 322 (1967), appeal dismissed, 390 U.S. 714 (1968).
44. 96 Neb. 532, 148 N.W. 507 (1914).
45. Id. at 537, 148 N.W. at 509.
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organized. It is only in this sense that -the public school system
could have qualified as a state institution following passage and
implementation of L.B. 772.
It is clear that the school district has not historically been a
part of state government in a formal sense, but rather has been
considered a unit of local self-government. 46 It is equally clear that
this should not have settled the issue in Lawrence. The question
of qualification as a state institution remained unanswered by the
in the negative by Judge Newton in
majority, 'but was answered
47
his concurring opinion.
The state has historically been charged with the responsibility
of providing education for its citizens in general, but especially for
its youth. Article VII of the Constitution of Nebraska requires the
legislature to provide free instruction in the common schools of the
state and establishes an administrative apparatus for the state public school system. This responsibility was noted by the supreme
court in Carlberg v. Metcalfe.48 An action was brought to enjoin
the city of Omaha from establishing -a municipal university authorized by the legislature. The appellant contended that the legislative authorization was unconstitutional because the city had
adopted a "home rule" charter, allowing it to operate independently
of the state in matters of strictly municipal concern. The court
acknowledged that there was no certain test separating state from
strictly municipal concerns, 'but concluded that education was a
matter of state concern. This conclusion was based on the constitutional duty imposed by Article VII and the degree of control exercised 'by the state in the area, such as compulsory education, certification of teachers, and inspection of private schools. The social role
of education itself, however, appeared to be the deciding factor:
"[education] is preeminently a state affair. The schools, in which
are educated the children who are to become in time the directors
are matters of state and not of strictly
of our political destinies,
49
municipal concern.1
The power of the state to delegate the responsibility for performing its governmental duties to agencies created for that pur46. See, e.g., Campbell v. Area Vocational Technical School No. 2, 183 Neb.
318, 159 N.W.2d 817 (1968); Schulz v. Dixon County, 134 Neb. 549, 279
N.W. 179 (1938).
I wish to point out that under the legislative implementation
47.
of the constitutional command to provide for the common
schools, local school districts are not part of state government
nor are they state institutions within the meaning of the language of Article HI, section 3, of the Constitution of Nebraska.
192 Neb. at 509-10, 222 N.W.2d at 811 (1974) (Newton, J. concurring).
48. 120 Neb. 481, 234 N.W. 87 (1930).
-49. Id. at 488, 234 N.W. at 91.
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pose, while retaining absolute power to alter or terminate the relationship, is widely recognized.5 0 After the state has created and
allocated to the school district the duty of providing education, the
district serves as a "governmental subdivision" 51 in -performing that
duty. "State concern," it should be noted, is not synonymous with
"state institution," and the court in Lawrence would still have been
faced with a difficult question had it systematically analyzed the
problem.
Statutory changes can transform an activity traditionally conducted by a local unit of self-government into a state function. The
court was recently faced with an analogous issue in State ex rel.
Western Nebraska Technical Community College Area v. Tallon.52
The constitutionality of a property tax levy in partial support of
the technical community college system was challenged. The state
was prohibited from levying a property tax for state purposes, 53
but was not prohibited from requiring a county to levy a tax for
substantially local purposes. 54 Traditionally the academic junior
colleges were locally controlled and financed by local property
taxes on property within -the district. In 1965 the legislature permitted establishment of vocational schools on a multi-county area
basis. In 1971 all the schools and colleges were placed into a statewide system. A state board was created and given general supervisory powers and control over the system. Area boards were also
established and given the power of administrative control of the
area institution. Both local and state purposes were served, but
the court found the state purpose -dominant and held the levy imposed on the counties unconstitutional. The key elements were the
degree of control over the statewide system reserved for the state
board and the assumption of the primary burden of financial support by the state.
"State purpose," like "state concern," is not synonymous with
"state institution." The basic notion of the Tallon decision is applicable to bills such as L.B. 772, however. A significant change
in the relationship between the state and a governmental subdivision performing delegated duties of state concern may transform
a previously local institution into a state institution. 55 The court
50. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
51. Campbell v. Area Vocational Technical School No. 2, 183 Neb. 318, 324,
159 N.W.2d 817, 821 (1968).
52. 192 Neb. 201, 219 N.W.2d 454 (1974).
53. NEB. CoxsT. art. VIII, § IA.
54. Craig v. Board of Equalization, 183 Neb. 779, 164 N.W.2d 445 (1969).
55. The significance of such a transformation will extend beyond qualification for the exception to the referendum power. For example, the
Tallon decision would appear to support a challenge to any remaining
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has 'previously recognized the possibility of such a change. 50 Judge
Newton, concurring in Lawrence, was correct in stating that the
mere fact that an institution is subject to state supervisory control
does not make it a state institution. Neither is the matter of control irrelevant. A significant increase in the degree of state control,
when combined with other fundamental changes, such -as in the
level of funding, may alter the nature of an institution. L.B. 772
made a major change in the state funding commitment, but aside
from this there were no major structural changes. It is doubtful
that this alone is sufficient to establish the public school system
as a state institution. Even if it were sufficient, however, there
is no question -thatan act which simultaneously placed a previously
local institution in the category of state institution and funded that
institution would fail to meet the requirement of funding an institution in existence at the time of the act's passage. 57 L.B. 772 did
not appropriate funds for a state institution and thus failed to qualify for the exception to the referendum power.
D.

Public Policy Considerations

The language of the Lawrence decision raises an additional problem of interpretation. It should not be a prerequisite to finding
a measure which qualifies for the exception that the court face "a
case of the defeat of an appropriation for a specific sum of money
that would destroy the operation of the fundamental functions
* .. 8 of state government or institutions. If the act is an appropriation measure, as defined by the court, for the ordinary expenses
of state government or a state institution, it should qualify for the
exception to the referendum power regardless of whether an alternative funding source exists. Only if the court is unable to respond
to the three suggested cumulative questions should it turn to balproperty tax levy for the public school system as a state institution.
The school system, with its institution status, would arguably serve
a state rather than a substantially local purpose, thus making a property tax levy for its support unconstitutional. NEB. CoNsT. art. VIII,
§ IA. This would eliminate the possibility of a gradual change to total
financing by revenue from the sales and income tax, as envisioned by
the drafters of L.B. 772.
56. In Carlberg v. Metcalfe, 120 Neb. 481, 234 N.W. 87 (1930), the court
quoted with approval from Helmer v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App.
140, 141-42, 191 P. 1001 (1920), while referring to the distinction between "state" and "strictly municipal" affairs: "The term 'municipal
affairs' is not a fixed quantity, but fluctuates with every change in
the conditions upon which it is to operate." Id. at 487, 234 N.W. at
90.
57. NEB. CoNsT. art. III, § 3.
58. 192 Neb. at 509,222 N.W.2d at 811.
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ancing the basic purpose of the referendum, i.e., to give the people
the right to vote on specific legislation, against the purpose of the
exception for appropriation measures, i.e., to prevent the crippling
effect on state government or institutions of uncertainty and delay
in their financial affairs. 59 Incorporation of this consideration in
the court's initial analysis distorts the issue. If the measure otherwise qualifies for the exception it should be exempt from the refer
endum process regardless of whether its possible rejection endangers state government or institutions. 60
III. CONCLUSION
Critics of the referendum process might feel vindicated to some
degree by the sound rejection of L.B. 772 in the November 1974
general election.," The implications of Lawrence were emphasized
by this result. Legislators intent on passing innovative funding
measures face the prospect of a referendum, and drafters must
place the provisions of each act within the narrow exception of
Article III, section 3 if they wish to avoid this possibility.
The courts also face a difficult decision when the question of
compliance with the exception is raised. The method of analysis
suggested by the appellant in Lawrence and considered here offers
an orderly framework for making the decision. It is essential that
the court remain aware that traditional meanings assigned to terms,
such as "state institution," may be rendered obsolete by substantial
legislative changes. Flexibility in reviewing the traditional meanings of these terms is necessary to effectuate the exception to the
referendum power. Each innovative funding measure introduced
in the Legislature presents a potential challenge to that flexibility.
L.B. 772 was correctly submitted to referendum, but a clearer articulation of the considerations involved in qualifying for the constitutional exception is needed. The exception will continue to be of
doubtful practical significance until its perimeters are more fully
outlined.
Lauren J. Caster '76
59. Bartling v. Wait, 96 Neb. 532, 148 N.W. 507 (1914).
60. Cf. State ex rel. Morris v. Marsh, 183 Neb. 521, 545-46, 162 N.W.2d 262,
276-77 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
61. L.B. 772 appeared on the ballot as Proposition 300 and was defeated
by a vote of 177,704 in favor, and 250,908 against.

